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ABSTRACT: 
Lake et al argue persuasively that modelling human-like intelligence requires flexible, 
compositional representations in order to embody world knowledge. But human 
knowledge is too sparse and self-contradictory to be embedded in “intuitive theories.” 
We argue instead that knowledge is grounded in exemplar-based learning and 
generalization, combined with high flexible generalization, a viewpoint compatible 
both with non-parametric Bayesian modelling and sub-symbolic methods such as 
neural networks. 
MAIN TEXT:  
 
Lake et al make a powerful case for the modelling human-like intelligence depends on 
highly flexible, compositional representations, to embody world knowledge. But will 
such knowledge really be embedded in “intuitive theories” of physics or psychology? 
This commentary argues that there is a paradox at the heart of the “intuitive theory” 
view point---that has be-devilled analytic philosophy and symbolic artificial 
intelligence: human knowledge is both (i) extremely sparse and (ii) self-contradictory 
(e.g., Oaksford & Chater 1991). 
 The sparseness of intuitive knowledge is exemplified in Rozenbilt and Keil’s 
(2002) discussion of the “illusion of explanatory depth.” We have the feeling that we 
understand how a crossbow works, how a fridge stays cold, or how electricity flows 
around the house. Yet, when pressed, few of us can provide much more than sketchy 
and incoherent fragments of explanation. Thus, our causal models of the physical 
world appear shallow. The sparseness of intuitive psychology seems at least as 
striking: indeed, our explanations of our own and other’s behavior often appear to be 
highly ad hoc (Nisbett & Ross 1980).  
 Moreover, our physical and psychological intuitions are also self-
contradictory. The foundations of physics and rational choice theory has consistently 
shown how remarkably few axioms (e.g., the laws of thermodynamics; the axioms of 
decision theory) completely fix a considerable body of theory. Yet our intuitions 
about heat and work, or probability and utility, are vastly richer and more 
amorphous—and cannot be captured in any consistent system (e.g., some of our 
intuitions may imply our axioms; but others will contradict them). Indeed, 
contradictions can also be evident even in apparent innocuous mathematical or logical 
assumptions (as illustrated by Russell’s paradox, which unexpectedly exposed a 
contradiction in Frege’s attempted logical foundation for mathematics, Irvine & 
Deutsch 2016).  
 The sparse and contradictory nature of our intuitions explains why explicit 
theorizing requires continually ironing out contradictions, making vague concepts 
precise, and radically distorting or replacing existing concepts. And the lesson of two 
and half millennia of philosophy is arguable that clarifying even the most basic 
concepts, such as ‘object’ or ‘the good’ can be entirely intractable, a lesson re-learned 
in symbolic AI. In any case, the raw materials for this endeavor—our disparate 
intuitions—may not properly be viewed as organized as theories at all.  
 If this is so, how do we interact so successfully in the physical and social 
worlds? We have experience, whether direct or by observation or instruction, of 
crossbows, fridges and electricity, to be able to interact with them in familiar ways. 
Indeed, our ability to make sense of new physical situations often appears to involve 
creative extrapolation from familiar examples: e.g., assuming that heavy objects will 
fall faster than light objects, even in a vacuum, or where air resistance can be 
neglected. Similarly, we have a vast repertoire of experience of human interaction, 
from which we can generalize to new interactions. Generalization from such 
experiences, to deal with new cases, can be extremely flexible and abstract 
(Hofstadter 2001). For example, the perceptual system uses astonishing ingenuity to 
construct complex percepts (e.g., human faces) from highly impoverished signals 
(e.g., Hoffman 2000; Rock 1983) or interpret art (Gombrich 1960).  
 We suspect that the growth and operation of cognition is more closely 
analogous to case law than it is to scientific theory. Each new case is decided by 
reference to the facts of that present case, and to ingenious and open-ended links to 
precedents from past cases; and the history of cases creates an intellectual tradition 
which is only locally coherent, often ill-defined, but surprisingly effective in dealing 
with a complex and ever-changing world. In short, knowledge has the form of a 
loosely inter-linked history of reusable fragments, each building on the last, rather 
than being organized into anything resembling a scientific theory.  
Recent work on construction-based approaches to language exemplify this 
viewpoint in the context of linguistics (e.g., Goldberg 1995). Rather than seeing 
language as generated by a theory (a formally specified grammar) and the acquisition 
of language as the fine-tuning of that theory, such approaches see language as a 
tradition, where each new language processing episode, like a new legal case, is dealt 
with by reference to past instances (Christiansen & Chater 2016). In both law and 
language (see Blackburn 1984), there will be a tendency to impose local coherence 
across similar instances, but there will typically be no globally coherent theory from 
which all cases can be generated.  
 Case-, instance- or exemplar-based theorizing has been widespread in the 
cognitive sciences (e.g., Kolodner 1993; Logan 1988; Medin & Shaffer 1978). 
Exploring how creative extensions of past experience can be used to deal with new 
experience (presumably by processes of analogy and metaphor rather than deductive 
theorizing from basic principles) provides an exciting challenge for artificial 
intelligence, whether from a non-parametric Bayesian standpoint or a neural network 
perspective, and is likely to require drawing on the strengths of both.  
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